Gulf of Tonkin, 30 July to 8 August 1964, and after: who did what, and when
As of 2026-10-02. Times are UTC. Washington was on daylight time (UTC-4) and the Tonkin Gulf is UTC+7, so the same moment reads 11 hours later in the Gulf than in Washington. One source (Prados) converts at UTC-5, which would make Washington clock times an hour later than drawn here; events given in Washington clock time (the calls, the Herrick message, the staff meeting) therefore carry about one hour of uncertainty. Panel B shows both clocks for that reason. Events whose exact time is not given are hollow or shown as bars. Quoted facts were read in the cited documents, as marked.
Shape = kind of source: machine-recorded data a primary document an official statement a person's account a scholar's account a news report Style = status: 2+ sources agree one source sources differ our inference / time not reported the same event at another source's time Every dot is a link to its main source; the table lists all sources.
Panel A: 30 July to 8 August 1964 (UTC, one tick per day)
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Panel B: 4 and 5 August 1964 in hours (UTC, with Washington and Gulf clocks)
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Panel C: afterwards, 1964 to 2005 (one tick per five years)
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Events (numbers match the diagram)
| # | When (UTC) | What | Status | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 30 Jul 1964 17:30 (approx.) | 34-A raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu (about 00:30 on 31 July, local) Prados: the raid 'hit at half past midnight, July 31'. Local time is UTC+7, so about 17:30 UTC on 30 July. | single analysis | n:tonkin-1964-07-30-34-a-raid-on-hon-me-and:0 |
| 2 | 02 Aug 1964 08:05 (approx.) | 2 Aug: Maddox fires three warning rounds; North Vietnamese boats attack Hanyok: about 1505 Gulf time (08:05 UTC) the Maddox fired three rounds to warn off the boats; the administration did not report this and said the Vietnamese boats fired first. Jets from the Ticonderoga arrived within about fifteen minutes; one boat was left dead in the water and two damaged. | reported analysis | main link, n:tonkin-1964-08-02-maddox-fires-three-warning-rounds-north-vietnamese:0, n:tonkin-1964-08-02-maddox-fires-three-warning-rounds-north-vietnamese:1 |
| 3 | 03 Aug 1964 14:30 | McNamara to LBJ (10:30 a.m. EDT): explain OPLAN 34-A to Congress Transcription: 'explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on.' | reported document | n:tonkin-1964-08-03-mcnamara-to-lbj-explain-oplan-34-a:0, n:tonkin-1964-08-03-mcnamara-to-lbj-explain-oplan-34-a:1 |
| 4 | 03 Aug 1964 17:00 to 23:00 | Second 34-A raid, night of 3/4 August (time not stated) Prados: another raid on the night of 3/4 August as the destroyers began their run back up the Gulf. The bar is an inference for the local night, not a stated time. | inferred analysis | n:tonkin-1964-08-03-second-34-a-raid-night-of-3:0 |
| 5 | 05 Aug 1964 (date only) | 5 Aug: US retaliatory air strikes on North Vietnam Hanyok refers to 'the retaliatory air strikes of 5 August'. Time of day not given here. | single analysis | main link, n:tonkin-1964-08-05-us-retaliatory-air-strikes-on-north-vietnam:0 |
| 6 | 06 Aug 1964 (date only) | 6 Aug: McNamara tells senators the Navy 'was not aware of' South Vietnamese actions Quoted by Prados from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's published executive sessions (vol. XVI, p. 293); the record was not read directly. | single analysis | n:tonkin-1964-08-06-mcnamara-tells-senators-the-navy-was-not:0 |
| 7 | 06 Aug 1964 (date only) | 6 Aug: Fulbright opens the Senate debate and states the 4 August attack as fact Fulbright: 'On August 4 the Maddox and another destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, were again attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in international waters ... without any doubt a calculated act of military aggression.' Congressional Record, Senate, 6 Aug 1964, p. 18399, read on the page image. See claim tonkin-fulbright-opening-aug4-as-fact. | single official | n:tonkin-1964-08-06-fulbright-opens-senate-debate-aug4-as-fact:0 |
| 8 | 07 Aug 1964 (date only) | 7 Aug: Tonkin Gulf Resolution passes (House 416-0, Senate 88-2) Signed 10 August. Senate: read in the Congressional Record, p. 18470 (yeas 88, nays 2: Gruening and Morse; 10 not voting). House: the Record prints 416-0 on Roll No. 210 (p. 18555), under suspension of the rules (see claim tonkin-house-debate-aug7). | reported official | main link, n:tonkin-1964-08-07-tonkin-gulf-resolution-passes:0, n:tonkin-1964-08-07-tonkin-gulf-resolution-passes:1, n:tonkin-1964-08-07-tonkin-gulf-resolution-passes:2, n:tonkin-1964-08-07-tonkin-gulf-resolution-passes:3, n:tonkin-1964-08-07-tonkin-gulf-resolution-passes:4 |
| 9 | 08 Aug 1964 (date only) | 8 Aug: CIA cover note sends Bundy the selected intercepts Prados: a cover note of 8 August accompanied the intercepts 'selected by CIA and NSA' that the White House had requested. | single document | n:tonkin-1964-08-08-cia-cover-note-sends-bundy-the-selected:0 |
| 10 | 04 Aug 1964 11:40 | Report 7: boats told to be ready for 'military operations' that night Read: 'imminent plans of DRV naval action possibly against Desoto mission'; T-142 and T-146 to ready, T-333 to join if oil can be found. Date-time group 04/1140Z per Prados (the OCR of the group is unclear). Hanyok reads later Phu Bai reports as a salvage and tow operation. | single document | main link, n:tonkin-1964-08-04-report-7-boats-told-to-be-ready:0, n:tonkin-1964-08-04-report-7-boats-told-to-be-ready:1 |
| 11 | 04 Aug 1964 12:40 | Destroyers' first reported radar sightings (04/1240Z) Prados. The base of the Swatow boats, Quang Khe, was about 110 nautical miles from Hon Me, too far to reach in the time between the intercept and this report. | single analysis | n:tonkin-1964-08-04-destroyers-first-reported-radar-sightings:0 |
| 12 | 04 Aug 1964 13:43 | McNamara to LBJ (9:43 a.m. EDT): ship 'allegedly' to be attacked tonight Read in transcription: 'this ship is allegedly uh to be attacked tonight'. Before any attack on the destroyers was reported. Conditional planning followed ('in the event he is attacked'). | reported document | n:tonkin-1964-08-04-mcnamara-to-lbj-ship-allegedly-to-be:0, n:tonkin-1964-08-04-mcnamara-to-lbj-ship-allegedly-to-be:1 |
| 13 | 04 Aug 1964 14:53 | McNamara to LBJ (10:53 a.m. EDT): reports the supposed engagement Per the tapes commentary, McNamara 'mistakenly reports' what the aircraft saw. Details of the call were not read in full. | single document | n:tonkin-1964-08-04-mcnamara-to-lbj-reports-the-supposed-engagement:0 |
| 14 | 04 Aug 1964 16:02 | Destroyers report evading torpedoes and having 'sunk' a craft (04/1602Z) Prados. Stockdale, overhead, saw no boats and later wrote 'absolutely no gunfire except our own'. | single analysis | n:tonkin-1964-08-04-destroyers-report-evading-torpedoes-and-having-sunk:0 |
| 15 | 04 Aug 1964 16:30 | Report 12: boat reports an enemy aircraft falling into the sea Read: 'enemy aircraft was observed falling into the sea; enemy vessel perhaps wounded'. Mentions aircraft; the date-time group in the OCR is smudged (04/1630Z per Prados). | single document | main link, n:tonkin-1964-08-04-report-12-boat-reports-an-enemy-aircraft:0 |
| 16 | 04 Aug 1964 16:44 | Report 13: 'we shot at two enemy airplanes... we sacrificed two comrades' Read. The report speaks of aircraft, not ships. Hanyok: it appears to combine two separate messages into one translation, and 'comrades' was rendered as 'boats'; the original Vietnamese text cannot be located. | reported document | main link, n:tonkin-1964-08-04-report-13-we-shot-at-two-enemy:0, n:tonkin-1964-08-04-report-13-we-shot-at-two-enemy:1 |
| 17 | 04 Aug 1964 17:27 to 18:27 | Herrick's doubt message SENT (1:27 p.m. Washington time) Prados, quoting a 28 Aug 1964 chronology: contacts 'appear doubtful'; 'freak weather effects' and 'over-eager sonarmen'; 'no visual sightings'. DISCREPANCIES: (1) earlier reports said the message was received at 1:27 p.m.; the chronology says sent. (2) The bar spans 17:27 to 18:27 UTC because it is unclear whether 'Washington time' means daylight time (UTC-4) or the UTC-5 that Prados uses to convert. The message itself was not read. | disputed analysis | n:tonkin-1964-08-04-herrick-s-doubt-message-sent:0 |
| 18 | 05 Aug 1964 12:00 | White House staff meeting memo (8 a.m. EDT): evidence 'less than we had yesterday' Read. Bundy: evidence for the second attack 'less than we had yesterday', 'eliminating double counting and mistaken signals'; 'This much seemed certain: There was an attack.' Also: he 'welcomed the recent events as justification for a resolution the Administration had wanted for some time.' | reported document | main link, n:tonkin-1964-08-05-white-house-staff-meeting-memo-evidence-less:0, n:tonkin-1964-08-05-white-house-staff-meeting-memo-evidence-less:1 |
| 19 | 20 Feb 1968 (date only) | 1968: McNamara cites 'unimpeachable' intercepts to the Senate; does not leave copies Opening statement of 20 February 1968, quoted by Prados. | single analysis | n:tonkin-1968-02-20-mcnamara-cites-unimpeachable-intercepts-to-the-senate:0 |
| 20 | 24 Jun 1970 (date only) | 24 Jun 1970: Senate votes 81-10 to repeal the Tonkin Resolution (Dole amendment) Read in the Congressional Record, p. 21132 [No. 167 Leg.]. The ten nays include Fulbright, who said in the same debate 'I am going to vote for its repeal' and objected to the procedure (p. 21119). See claim tonkin-resolution-repealed-1970. Voteview record: To amend h.r. 15628 by repealing the gulf of tonkin resolution effective at the end of the 91st congress. Result: n/a; yea 81, nay 10. Roll call 398. | single official | main link, n:vote-RS0910398:0, n:vote-RS0910398:1 |
| 21 | 20 Jan 1972 (date only) | 1972: NSA's deputy director concedes the 4 Aug intercept could refer to 2 Aug Hanyok's note 7: a 20 January 1972 meeting between Dr. Louis Tordella and SFRC staff chief Carl Marcy; Tordella could not produce the original. | single analysis | main link, n:tonkin-1972-01-20-nsa-s-deputy-director-concedes-the-4:0 |
| 22 | 09 Nov 1995 (date only) | 1995: Giap tells McNamara in Hanoi that nothing happened on 4 Aug Seattle Times report of the 9 Nov 1995 meeting. | single media | n:tonkin-1995-11-09-giap-tells-mcnamara-in-hanoi-that-nothing:0 |
| 23 | 20 Jun 1997 12:00 to 23 Jun 1997 12:00 | 1997: Hanoi conference; Giap says 2 Aug was ordered by a local command Prados attended; he reports Giap's statement to McNamara (his note 13). | single analysis | n:tonkin-1997-06-20-hanoi-conference-giap-says-2-aug-was:0 |
| 24 | 2001 (year only) | Early 2001: Hanyok study in NSA's classified Cryptologic Quarterly Per the National Security Archive's 2005 posting. | single document | main link, n:tonkin-2001-03-01-hanyok-study-in-nsa-s-classified-cryptologic:0 |
| 25 | Mar 2003 (month only) | March 2003: the five intercept reports declassified Prados: declassified in March 2003 on a Mandatory Declassification Review request. The scan carries a NARA review stamp dated 3-13-03. | reported document | main link, n:tonkin-2003-03-15-the-five-intercept-reports-declassified:0, n:tonkin-2003-03-15-the-five-intercept-reports-declassified:1 |
| 26 | 01 Dec 2005 (date only) | 1 Dec 2005: NSA declassifies about 140 documents, including the Hanyok study National Security Archive posting of 1 December 2005. | reported document | n:tonkin-2005-12-01-nsa-declassifies-about-140-documents-including-the:0, n:tonkin-2005-12-01-nsa-declassifies-about-140-documents-including-the:1 |
People and bodies involved
- Lyndon B. Johnson: President. Spoke with McNamara by phone on 3 and 4 August; the calls are on tape (transcribed by Prados).
- Robert S. McNamara: Secretary of Defense. Said privately on 3 August that OPLAN 34-A 'had bearing on' the Maddox engagement; told the Senate on 6 August the Navy 'was not aware of' South Vietnamese actions (via Prados); in the 4 August call said the ship was 'allegedly' to be attacked that night.
- McGeorge Bundy: National Security Adviser. At the 5 August 8 a.m. staff meeting said the evidence for the second attack was 'less than we had yesterday', that 'There was an attack', and that he 'welcomed the recent events as justification for a resolution the Administration had wanted for some time'.
- Douglass Cater: New White House staffer who questioned the need for a resolution at that meeting.
- William Y. Smith: Military aide; named by Prados as the author of the staff-meeting memorandum (the OCR of the scan does not show the author line).
- Capt. John Herrick: On-scene commander of the destroyers; his message that contacts 'appear doubtful' is quoted by Prados from a 28 Aug 1964 chronology.
- Cdr. James Stockdale: Led the Ticonderoga jets overhead on 4 August; later wrote there was 'absolutely no gunfire except our own' (Prados).
- Adm. Thomas Moorer: Kept a dud shell from a 2 August boat as a souvenir (Prados).
- Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp: Pacific Fleet commander; proceeded as if the attacks were genuine (tapes commentary).
- Vo Nguyen Giap: North Vietnam's defense minister; told McNamara in 1995 that nothing happened on 4 August; at a 1997 Hanoi conference said the 2 August action was ordered by a local naval command.
- Sens. Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening: The two senators who voted against the Resolution (88-2).
- J. Norvill Jones and Carl Marcy: Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff who later saw the intercepts; Jones said the 4 August one 'was a boastful summary of the attack on August 2' (Prados).
- Dr. Louis Tordella: NSA deputy director; in 1972 conceded the 4 August intercept could refer to 2 August and could not produce the original (Hanyok's note).
- Robert J. Hanyok: NSA historian; wrote the 2001 study, declassified 2005.
- John Prados: National Security Archive analyst; edited Briefing Book 132 and wrote the 2004 essay used here.
- NSA units: Phu Bai (Marine detachment, whose analytic error Hanyok says began the 4 August incident), San Miguel (Navy), and the Maddox's own Naval Security Group detachment.
- North Vietnamese boats: Swatow boats T-142 and T-146 and torpedo boat T-333 appear in the intercepts.
Sources
s_hanyokHanyok, Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish (NSA, 2001), National Security Archive copy, 56 pp. authenticity: authenticated, moderate (copy not byte-compared with NSA's)s_memoMemorandum for the Record, White House staff meeting, 5 Aug 1964 authenticity: authenticated, moderates_interceptsNSA SIGINT intercept reports, Aug 1964 (declassified 2003) authenticity: authenticated, moderates_essayPrados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentss_tapesLBJ tapes on the Gulf of Tonkin (transcriptions by Prados) authenticity: transcription; audio not heards_pressNational Security Archive posting, 1 Dec 2005, on the NSA release authenticity: secondary accounts_senateSenate.gov, Chairman Fulbright and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution authenticity: official history; vote counts not read in the Records_vote_sVoteview, Senate roll call 481, 7 Aug 1964, H.J.Res. 1145 (88 yea, 2 nay) authenticity: dataset of the official roll call; Congressional Record not reads_vote_hVoteview, House roll call 197, 7 Aug 1964, H.J.Res. 1145 (416 yea, 0 nay) authenticity: dataset of the official roll call; Congressional Record not reads_crec64Congressional Record, Senate, 7 Aug 1964 (p. 18470: roll call 88-2) authenticity: GPO bound Record, authenticated, strongs_crec70Congressional Record, Senate, 24 June 1970 (p. 21132: roll call 81-10) authenticity: GPO bound Record, authenticated, strongs_cfrCouncil on Foreign Relations, Congress passes the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authenticity: secondarys_seattleSeattle Times, 9 Nov 1995: McNamara asks for truth about Gulf of Tonkin, Giap: there was no attack authenticity: news archiven:tonkin-1964-07-30-34-a-raid-on-hon-me-and:0Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-02-maddox-fires-three-warning-rounds-north-vietnamese:0Hanyok, Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish (NSA, 2001), National Security Archive copy, 56 pp. authenticity: authenticated, moderate (copy not byte-compared with NSA's)n:tonkin-1964-08-02-maddox-fires-three-warning-rounds-north-vietnamese:1Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-03-mcnamara-to-lbj-explain-oplan-34-a:0LBJ tapes on the Gulf of Tonkin (transcriptions by Prados) authenticity: transcription; audio not heardn:tonkin-1964-08-03-mcnamara-to-lbj-explain-oplan-34-a:1Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-03-second-34-a-raid-night-of-3:0Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-05-us-retaliatory-air-strikes-on-north-vietnam:0Hanyok, Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish (NSA, 2001), National Security Archive copy, 56 pp. authenticity: authenticated, moderate (copy not byte-compared with NSA's)n:tonkin-1964-08-06-mcnamara-tells-senators-the-navy-was-not:0Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-06-fulbright-opens-senate-debate-aug4-as-fact:0Congressional Record, Vol. 110, Part 14 (Senate, 6 August 1964), GPO bound edition, granule GPO-CRECB-1964-pt14-3-2 authenticity: authenticated, strong (see the dig's sources manifest)n:tonkin-1964-08-07-tonkin-gulf-resolution-passes:0Congressional Record, Senate, 7 Aug 1964 (p. 18470: roll call 88-2) authenticity: GPO bound Record, authenticated, strongn:tonkin-1964-08-07-tonkin-gulf-resolution-passes:1Voteview, Senate roll call 481, 7 Aug 1964, H.J.Res. 1145 (88 yea, 2 nay) authenticity: dataset of the official roll call; Congressional Record not readn:tonkin-1964-08-07-tonkin-gulf-resolution-passes:2Voteview, House roll call 197, 7 Aug 1964, H.J.Res. 1145 (416 yea, 0 nay) authenticity: dataset of the official roll call; Congressional Record not readn:tonkin-1964-08-07-tonkin-gulf-resolution-passes:3Senate.gov, Chairman Fulbright and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution authenticity: official history; vote counts not read in the Recordn:tonkin-1964-08-07-tonkin-gulf-resolution-passes:4Council on Foreign Relations, Congress passes the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authenticity: secondaryn:tonkin-1964-08-08-cia-cover-note-sends-bundy-the-selected:0Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-04-report-7-boats-told-to-be-ready:0NSA SIGINT intercept reports, Aug 1964 (declassified 2003) authenticity: authenticated, moderaten:tonkin-1964-08-04-report-7-boats-told-to-be-ready:1Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-04-destroyers-first-reported-radar-sightings:0Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-04-mcnamara-to-lbj-ship-allegedly-to-be:0LBJ tapes on the Gulf of Tonkin (transcriptions by Prados) authenticity: transcription; audio not heardn:tonkin-1964-08-04-mcnamara-to-lbj-ship-allegedly-to-be:1Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-04-mcnamara-to-lbj-reports-the-supposed-engagement:0LBJ tapes on the Gulf of Tonkin (transcriptions by Prados) authenticity: transcription; audio not heardn:tonkin-1964-08-04-destroyers-report-evading-torpedoes-and-having-sunk:0Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-04-report-12-boat-reports-an-enemy-aircraft:0NSA SIGINT intercept reports, Aug 1964 (declassified 2003) authenticity: authenticated, moderaten:tonkin-1964-08-04-report-13-we-shot-at-two-enemy:0NSA SIGINT intercept reports, Aug 1964 (declassified 2003) authenticity: authenticated, moderaten:tonkin-1964-08-04-report-13-we-shot-at-two-enemy:1Hanyok, Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish (NSA, 2001), National Security Archive copy, 56 pp. authenticity: authenticated, moderate (copy not byte-compared with NSA's)n:tonkin-1964-08-04-herrick-s-doubt-message-sent:0Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1964-08-05-white-house-staff-meeting-memo-evidence-less:0Memorandum for the Record, White House staff meeting, 5 Aug 1964 authenticity: authenticated, moderaten:tonkin-1964-08-05-white-house-staff-meeting-memo-evidence-less:1Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1968-02-20-mcnamara-cites-unimpeachable-intercepts-to-the-senate:0Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-1972-01-20-nsa-s-deputy-director-concedes-the-4:0Hanyok, Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish (NSA, 2001), National Security Archive copy, 56 pp. authenticity: authenticated, moderate (copy not byte-compared with NSA's)n:tonkin-1995-11-09-giap-tells-mcnamara-in-hanoi-that-nothing:0Seattle Times, 9 Nov 1995: McNamara asks for truth about Gulf of Tonkin, Giap: there was no attack authenticity: news archiven:tonkin-1997-06-20-hanoi-conference-giap-says-2-aug-was:0Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-2001-03-01-hanyok-study-in-nsa-s-classified-cryptologic:0Hanyok, Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish (NSA, 2001), National Security Archive copy, 56 pp. authenticity: authenticated, moderate (copy not byte-compared with NSA's)n:tonkin-2003-03-15-the-five-intercept-reports-declassified:0Prados, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later (2004 essay) authenticity: a 2004 essay; footnotes primary documentsn:tonkin-2003-03-15-the-five-intercept-reports-declassified:1NSA SIGINT intercept reports, Aug 1964 (declassified 2003) authenticity: authenticated, moderaten:tonkin-2005-12-01-nsa-declassifies-about-140-documents-including-the:0National Security Archive posting, 1 Dec 2005, on the NSA release authenticity: secondary accountn:tonkin-2005-12-01-nsa-declassifies-about-140-documents-including-the:1Hanyok, Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish (NSA, 2001), National Security Archive copy, 56 pp. authenticity: authenticated, moderate (copy not byte-compared with NSA's)n:vote-RS0910398:0Congressional Record, Senate, 24 June 1970 (p. 21132: roll call 81-10) authenticity: GPO bound Record, authenticated, strongn:vote-RS0910398:1Voteview, Senate roll call 398, 24 Jun 1970 (91st Congress), Dole amendment to H.R. 15628 to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (81 yea, 10 nay) authenticity: dataset of the official roll call; counts agree with the Congressional Record page read (p. 21132)
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